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Detection of pathogens in the food chain is limited 
mainly to bacteria, and the globalization of the food indus-
try enables international viral foodborne outbreaks to occur. 
Outbreaks from 2002 through 2006 recorded in a European 
norovirus surveillance database were investigated for viro-
logic and epidemiologic indicators of food relatedness. The 
resulting validated multivariate logistic regression model 
comparing foodborne (n = 224) and person-to-person (n = 
654) outbreaks was used to create a practical web-based 
tool that can be limited to epidemiologic parameters for 
nongenotyping countries. Non–genogroup-II.4 outbreaks, 
higher numbers of cases, and outbreaks in restaurants or 
households characterized (sensitivity = 0.80, specifi city = 
0.86) foodborne outbreaks and reduced the percentage of 
outbreaks requiring source-tracing to 31%. The selection 
tool enabled prospectively focused follow-up. Use of this 
tool is likely to improve data quality and strain typing in cur-
rent surveillance systems, which is necessary for identifi ca-
tion of potential international foodborne outbreaks.  
Globalization of the food industry, centralized produc-tion, and the wide geographic distribution of products 
support the need for increased international surveillance 
of foodborne viral outbreaks, which may occur in clusters 
in different countries. Because control of pathogens in the 
food chain requires hazard analysis critical control points 
and verifi cation of measures taken, detection of the patho-
gen is an important step (1). However, viral contamination 
of food is less likely to be recognized than bacterial con-
tamination due to the infrequency of testing for viruses (2). 
Moreover, foods acceptable by bacterial standards are not 
necessarily safe from viral contamination. For example, 
norovirus may be present in shellfi sh and still meet the 
European Union Escherichia coli standard for human con-
sumption (3). Consequently, foodborne viral infections are 
common, despite successful measures to reduce bacterial 
contamination. Recognition of foodborne viral outbreaks 
with international consequences would benefi t from a 
linked and consistent reporting network among countries. 
The challenge for surveillance systems is to obtain a 
complete dataset for the reported outbreaks (4). The Euro-
pean Food Safety Authority (EFSA) recognized this chal-
lenge and began developing guidelines for an international 
reporting system for foodborne outbreaks caused by bac-
teria, viruses, or parasites (working group of foodborne 
outbreak surveillance, www.efsa.europa.eu). The need for 
a better surveillance system has also been recognized by 
the Foodborne Viruses in Europe (FBVE) network, which 
has conducted virus-specifi c surveillance of gastroenteritis 
outbreaks since 1999 (5). Although the name FBVE sug-
gests a foodborne focus, the network actually investigates 
outbreaks from all modes of transmission to obtain a com-
prehensive overview of viral activity in the community. A 
total of 13 countries are participating in the FBVE surveil-
lance network, 11 of which are capable of collecting inte-
grated epidemiologic and virologic surveillance data (6).
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Because of the etiologic dominance of viruses, the 
network’s primary focus is on norovirus infections (7) that 
have been more frequently reported in recent years after 
emergence of novel variant strains in the population (8,9). 
Kroneman et al. described strengths and limitations of the 
FBVE data collection (6) but stated that outbreak reports 
need to be interpreted with caution; the number and content 
of these reports may vary considerably among countries 
because surveillance databases may be different. Most of 
these reports link outbreaks to person-to-person transmis-
sion; international interventions and follow-up are rare. In 
≈40% of the outbreaks, no suspected mode of transmission 
was reported. Therefore, epidemiologic or virologic crite-
ria should be used during the early stages of an outbreak 
investigation to determine whether foodborne sources 
should be considered. Given that surveillance systems are 
overwhelmed during norovirus peak seasons, use of these 
criteria would assist in focusing follow-up activities. 
Our objective was to retrospectively derive, from sur-
veillance data, a predictive model that could serve prospec-
tively in the selection of norovirus outbreaks potentially 
related to food. Such a tool could be used to warn food 
safety authorities (FSAs) earlier, to improve the quality of 
outbreak report data, and to provide better estimates of the 
effects of viral foodborne disease. Our study demonstrates 
the added value of a reporting system amalgamated across 
countries; the FBVE dataset can form the basis of this tool, 
which may be a fi rst step towards detection of diffuse out-
breaks.
Methods
Categorizing Surveillance Systems 
Because surveillance systems are known to vary in 
terms of design, effectiveness, and priorities (6,9–11), a 
structured telephone survey/questionnaire (available from 
the authors) was conducted among FBVE participants to 
categorize national surveillance systems of the involved 
countries. If a participating country reported that their na-
tional system labeled outbreaks “person-to-person” as a 
diagnosis of exclusion, the data were excluded to avoid 
potential misclassifi cation of foodborne outbreaks and con-
sequent dilution of differentiating parameters.
Dataset
Combined epidemiologic and virologic outbreak re-
ports from countries capable of detecting foodborne out-
breaks derived from the FBVE network were collected in 
a protected web-based database on the basis of a structured 
questionnaire (www.fbve.nl/attachments/questionnaire.
pdf). Collection of sequence results focused on region A of 
the genome (www.rivm.nl/bnwww), but allowed other en-
tries (regions B, C, and D) because of the lack of standard-
ization between cooperating laboratories (12). Norovirus 
outbreaks were selected from this database if they fulfi lled 
the following minimum dataset: date of onset from January 
1, 2002, through December 31, 2006; norovirus detected 
as the only causative agent; and presence of a known no-
rovirus sequence or genotype. The surveillance database 
from April 2007 was used and accounted for the median 
reporting lag (6) and enabled completion of data entry for 
outbreaks in 2006. 
Parameters for Evidence
Data items used in the construction of the predictive 
model were derived from the EFSA draft guidelines (www.
efsa.europa.eu), which are being developed to achieve con-
sensus on the minimal variables to be reported for all food-
borne outbreaks and on additional variables to be reported 
for thoroughly investigated foodborne outbreaks. The list 
has been amended with data items for foodborne outbreaks 
as described in comprehensive overviews (13,14) and 
with data items required to enable interventions by an FSA 
(Table 1). 
Defi nitions
Outbreaks were reported when they satisfi ed the 
agreed-upon case defi nition (a cluster of >2 patients within 
2 days showing signs of acute gastroenteritis indicative of 
norovirus) (5,15). A gastroenteritis outbreak was ascribed 
to norovirus based on compatible descriptive epidemiol-
ogy and laboratory confi rmation according to agreed upon 
criteria (16). Because norovirus outbreaks typically oc-
cur in winter, an off-seasonal period was defi ned as May 
through September; a seasonal period was defi ned as Octo-
ber through April of the following year. An outbreak was 
considered foodborne when infection was related to con-
sumption of food contaminated during production or prepa-
ration. Where there was laboratory evidence of norovirus in 
food or analytical epidemiologic evidence for a food source 
through a case-control or cohort study, the outbreak was 
defi ned as confi rmed foodborne. When descriptive epide-
miologic data indicated a link to food, the outbreak was 
defi ned as probably foodborne. A random 50% of the total 
dataset was used as the training sample to build a model 
that distinguishes modes of transmission. The remaining 
50% was used as the validation sample to validate the mod-
el. Sensitivity, or true positives, of the model for foodborne 
outbreaks was the proportion of the number of foodborne 
outbreaks correctly labeled as foodborne. Specifi city, or 
true negatives, of the model for foodborne outbreaks was 
the proportion of the number of outbreaks reportedly due 
to person-to-person transmission that are indeed classifi ed 
as person-to-person transmission. The receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) curve was the graphic representation 
of the tradeoff between false negatives and false positives 
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for every possible cut-off. The area under curve (AUC) was 
used to determine how well the predictor (based on several 
variables) was able to discriminate between groups (1 = 
perfect, 0.5 = no discrimination). Positive predictive value 
(PPV) was the proportion of outbreaks that met the model’s 
foodborne criteria that are correctly labeled as such, indi-
cating effi ciency in reducing the workload of FSAs. 
Data Analysis
Selected norovirus outbreaks were divided among 3 
groups: confi rmed or probable foodborne outbreaks; out-
breaks resulting from person-to-person transmission; and 
outbreaks with an unknown mode of transmission. Data 
analysis was performed stepwise. First, completeness of 
data in the FBVE database with respect to the data-items in 
the consensus list (Table 1) was determined for outbreaks 
from foodborne and person-to-person transmission. De-
scriptive data were given for items relevant to foodborne 
outbreaks but not applicable to, or available for, outbreaks 
by person-to-person or unknown transmission. This includ-
ed information concerning the food vehicle, product-han-
dling hygiene, and place of preparation or consumption. 
Second, the consensus list of predefi ned data items 
was used to compare foodborne and person-to-person out-
breaks in the training sample by using logistic regression 
models. Variables were included in a multivariate model if 
they were statistically signifi cant with p<0.10 during uni-
variate analyses and if completeness of the variable was 
suffi cient (80%) to result in a valid model. Because a lo-
gistic regression model can only be considered valid if the 
number of parameters is <10% of the number of outbreaks 
in the smallest group, analyzed variables were included as 
continuous where possible. The variables remained in the 
multivariate model if p values were <0.10, while the back-
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Table 1. Consensus list of parameters for optimal reporting of foodborne (viral) outbreaks as defined by expert opinion, and 
completeness for data collected in the FBVE surveillance database*
Parameters for outbreak data Variable
Foodborne outbreak data 
(% missing), n = 224
Other mode outbreak data 
(% missing), n = 654
EFSA (confirmed/probable)† 
 Type of outbreak: general or household Yes 224 (0) 654 (0) 
 No. human cases‡ Yes 217 (3) 651 (0) 
 No. hospitalizations‡ Yes 78 (65) 295 (55) 
 No. deaths‡ Yes 66 (70) 195 (70) 
 Foodstuff implicated Yes 93 (58) NA‡
  Causative agent§  Yes 224 (0) 654 (0) 
 Setting Yes 224 (0) 654 (0) 
  Contributory factors Yes 202 (10) 482 (26) 
 Origin of foodstuff No  NA  NA 
 Strength of evidence food Yes 224 (0)  NA 
EFSA (thoroughly investigated)† 
 Reason reporting No  NA  NA 
 Laboratory results food Yes 202 (10)  NA 
 Place food produced  No  NA  NA 
 Place food consumed/purchased Descriptive 106 (52)  NA 
  Age-affected persons Categorical 11 (95) 73 (89) 
  Gender-affected persons Yes 27 (88) 106 (84) 
  Additional information on agent Yes 224 (0) 653 (0) 
Additional parameters in literature 
 Attack rate† Yes 121 (46) 226 (59) 
 Seasonality Yes 149 (33) 484 (26) 
 Duration of the outbreak† Yes 90 (60) 265 (59) 
 Epidemic curve/point source No 202 (10) 496 (24) 
 Sequence or variant Yes 224 (0) 654 (0) 
 Link with other outbreaks  Yes 22 (90) 15 (98) 
Additional parameters VWA experts 
 Incubation period Yes 51 (77) 65 (90) 
 Illness in food handlers and their family Partially 202 (10)  NA 
 Presence of ill persons in setting No  NA  NA 
*FBVE, Foodborne Viruses in Europe network; EFSA, European Food Safety Authority; NA, not applicable; VWA, Food and Consumer Products Safety 
Authority. Parameters listed in italics could not be included in univariate analyses.  
†Not restricted to viral. 
‡A systematic retrospective check of Dutch data showed that variables for no. cases involved were reported to the national institute by regional health 
services when the outbreak was ongoing, and that these numbers were not updated when the outbreak had finished. The same situation was reported for 
other countries during the telephone survey.  
§Inclusion criterion.  
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ward selection procedure was used or if they were found to 
be confounding factors for other variables in the model (β 
values changing at least 10%). The optimal cut-off value 
was determined in the training sample and validated in the 
validation sample. When the validated model performed 
well, the β values for the fi nal model were based on the to-
tal dataset, i.e., the validation and the training set together. 
Third, the fi nal model was used to create a web-based 
tool to assist public health workers in selecting outbreaks 
for further investigation when they receive outbreak re-
ports, and to calculate the predicted individual probabil-
ity of each outbreak with unknown mode of transmission 
caused by food. Individual probabilities of food relatedness 
were summarized to estimate the number of foodborne out-
breaks in the unknown group and in the total dataset.
Results
Categorizing Surveillance Systems 
Of the surveillance systems in the 13 participating 
countries, 11 met the FBVE network’s reporting criterion 
of linked laboratory and epidemiologic norovirus outbreak 
data. Of these 11 countries, 9 were included for analysis 
of parameters differentiating foodborne from person-to-
person outbreaks: Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. As a 
result of legislation, surveillance systems in 4 of these 9 
countries focused on foodborne outbreaks. Six of 9 coun-
tries reported at least 1 typed outbreak per million inhabit-
ants per year (intensive surveillance). Surveillance systems 
were categorized as follows: 1) intensive surveillance with 
focus on food; 2) intensive surveillance without focus on 
food; and 3) no intensive surveillance. 
Data Analysis
A total of 1,639 norovirus outbreaks occurring from 
January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2006, were report-
ed by the countries included. Figure 1 shows the selection 
of the fi nal dataset comprising 77% (1,254/1,639) of out-
breaks; the remaining 23% were excluded due to missing 
laboratory confi rmation of norovirus. Table 1 shows the 
completeness of analysis-set with respect to the parameters 
in the consensus list. The level of evidence for food-relat-
edness was confi rmed for 24 (11%) of 224 outbreaks and 
was probable for 200 (89%) foodborne outbreaks. Thirty 
food categories were associated with outbreaks, including 
shellfi sh, fruit, fancy cakes, buffets, sandwiches, and salads. 
In 1 foodborne outbreak, poor personal hygiene was men-
tioned as a contributory factor; an infected food-handler 
was reported in 16 outbreaks, with 1 cook being involved 
in 2 outbreaks; and hygiene rather than preparation or con-
sumption of food was mentioned in 2 outbreaks. Complete-
ness of FBVE data with respect to the consensus list of 
data-items varied between items and between foodborne 
and person-to-person outbreaks (Table 1). Completeness 
of data items varied between 2% (link to other outbreaks) 
and 100% (type of outbreak, setting, causative agent, im-
plicated strain). Data concerning hospitalization, attack 
rate, epidemic curve, incubation period, and links to other 
outbreaks were more likely to be reported for foodborne 
outbreaks. On the other hand, seasonality and contributory 
factors were more frequently reported for outbreaks with 
other modes of transmission.
The items in italics in Table 1 could not be included 
during univariate analyses because they played a role only 
when foodborne transmission occured or because data 
were not requested in the FBVE surveillance system. Risk 
factors resulting from univariate analyses are presented in 
Table 2 and show that foodborne outbreaks were found 
more often in households or restaurants and less often 
in healthcare settings, involved nongenogroup (GG) II.4 
strains relatively more frequently, were more likely to oc-
cur during off-seasonal months, and involved more cases 
when notifi ed compared to outbreaks from person-to-per-
son transmission. Table 2 shows all parameters included 
in the multivariate analysis that remained in the model 
during the backward selection procedure. The AUC in the 
training sample and in the validation sample was 0.92 and 
0.90, respectively, indicating the model performs very 
well in distinguishing foodborne outbreaks from person-
to-person transmission (Figure 2). In the validation sam-
ple, the optimal cut-off value (the value of the ROC curve 
closest to the upper left corner) resulted in a sensitivity of 
0.72, a specifi city of 0.92, and a PPV of 0.64; a follow-
up of outbreaks would have focused on 24% of the total 
number of reported outbreaks. The probability that an out-
break was attributed to food was calculated by using the 
following fi nal model, based on the complete dataset of 
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Outbreaks reported by 9 European countries
N = 2,482




No causative agent detected
n = 33




Group 3: Unknown mode of transmission
n = 376
Group 2: Person-to-person transmission
n = 654
Outbreak occurred in 2002–2006
n = 2,113
Outbreak before 2002 or after 2006
n = 276




Figure 1. Outbreaks reported to the Foodborne Viruses in Europe 
network from January 2002 through December 2006, by suspected 
or confi rmed cause and completeness of year and month of the 
outbreak, sequence information, and mode of transmission. Other 
causative agents include rotavirus, hepatitis A, and various bacteria.
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878 records and corrected for characteristics of national 
surveillance systems:







= exp (1.5477 + 0.8065 when in household) 
+ (0.0322 for each involved case when notifi ed) 
+ (3.0999 when in restaurant) 
or – (1.2963 when in hotel) 
or – (2.6616 when in hospital) 
or – (1.9912 when in daycare) 
or – (0.5289 when in school) 
+ (0.3190 when GGnonII.4) 
– (1.0270 if intensive surveillance and focus food) 
or – (2.0540 if intensive surveillance and no focus food)
This fi nal model (sensitivity = 0.80, specifi city = 0.86, 
PPV = 0.65) can be prospectively applied to calculate po-
tential food-relatedness of reported norovirus outbreaks 
and reduce the number of outbreaks to 31% of all report-
ed outbreaks. The practical web-based tool created with 
the model can be found in the online Technical Appen-
dix, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/15/1/31-
Techapp.xls. If this tool is used by a nongenotyping 
country, intensive surveillance can be considered to be at 
least 2 reported outbreaks (instead of 1 typed outbreak) 
per 1 million inhabitants per year. For the nongenotyping 
countries, the unknown genotype in the model resulted in 
an additional 5 unrecognized foodborne outbreaks coex-
isting with a slight reduction of sensitivity (0.78), equal 
specifi city (0.86), PPV (0.65), and 30% of the outbreaks 
requiring follow-up. 
Of 376 outbreaks with an unknown mode of transmis-
sion, data for 352 (94%) were suffi cient to calculate the 
probability of a foodborne outbreak. Summarizing indi-
vidual probabilities resulted in 100 (29%) of 352 potential 
foodborne outbreaks in the unknown group; summarizing 
probabilities in the total dataset resulted in an estimated 
280 (22%) of 1,254 reported outbreaks being possibly 
foodborne. 
Discussion
We built and validated a model to estimate the likeli-
hood that a norovirus outbreak was related to food. This 
study was the basis for a practical tool that can prospec-
tively be applied in near real-time in the European setting 
to identify potential foodborne viral outbreaks in both 
genotyping and nongenotyping countries. The model can 
also retrospectively estimate the true contribution of food 
to norovirus outbreaks in Europe, and may contribute to 
studies estimating the effects of foodborne gastroenteritis. 
Moreover, the user-friendly tool may support more consis-
tent reporting and typing of viral outbreaks. Our approach 
is innovative for norovirus surveillance and provides a new 
estimate for the proportion of foodborne outbreaks that is 
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Table 2. Factors (8 of 17) of borderline significance during univariate logistic regression in a random selection of 50% of the dataset for 
comparison of foodborne outbreaks (group 1) and outbreaks from other modes of transmission (group 2)*  
Indicator Category/measure 
Group 1 
(n = 112) 
Group 2 
(n = 327) 
Univariate, 
OR (95% CI) 
Univariate adjusted for 
country, OR (95% CI) 
Multivariate adjusted for 
country, OR (95% CI) 
1 General 105 325 Reference Reference Reference
Household 7 2 10.8 (2.2–52.9) 10.1 (1.6–64.3) 0.1 (0.0–1.0) 
2 No. cases†  –  – 1.1 (1.0–1.1) 1.0 (0.9–1.1) 1.1 (1.0–1.2) 
Residence 7 2 Reference Reference Reference
Restaurant‡ 36 1 10.3 (0.8–129.4) 13.2 (0.7–234.0) >999†
Healthcare institute 27 267 0.0 (0.0–0.1) 0.0 (0.0–0.1) 0.0 (0.0–0.0) 
Daycare 2 15 0.0 (0.0–0.3) 0.1 (0.0–0.9) 0.0 (0.0–0.1) 
Hotel/guest house 9 12 0.2 (0.0–1.3) 0.1 (0.0–1.3) 0.0 (0.0–0.1) 
School 11 9 0.3 (0.1–2.1) 0.3 (0.0–2.7) 0.0 (0.0–0.2) 
7
Other 20 21 0.3 (0.1–1.5) 0.3 (0.0–2.1) 0.0 (0.0–0.2) 
17 Non-GGII.4 55 48 Reference Reference Reference
Genogroup II.4 57 278 0.2 (0.1–0.3) 0.2 (0.1–0.4) 0.4 (0.2–1.0) 
18 Attack rate* – – 14.0 (3.6–54.0) 6.7 (1.5–34.3) –
19 May–Sep 20 35 Reference Reference –
Oct–Apr 47 208 0.4 (0.2–0.7) 0.5 (0.3–1.2) 
20 Duration in hours* – – 0.9 (0.8–0.9) 0.9 (0.8–1.0) –
21 No point source 60 242 Reference Reference
Point source 43 3 58.8 (17.3–192.7) 44.7 (11.8–167.7) –
*Significant factors were included in multivariate analyses to construct the final model. –, entered as a continuous variable. Parameters in italics could not 
be included in multivariate analysis because of missing values. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; GG, genogroup. 
†A systematic retrospective check of Netherlands data showed that variables for no. of cases involved were reported to the national institute by regional 
health services when the outbreak was ongoing, and that these numbers were not updated when the outbreak had finished. The same situation was 
reported for other countries during the telephone survey.  
‡The parameter restaurant was set to 0 because the variable was a linear combination of other variables as follows: Restaurant = intercept – household – 
health care – day care – hotel – school – other >999. 
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higher (22%) than the recognized proportion of foodborne 
outbreaks in countries that can separate transmission modes 
(18%). However, this higher estimate is based on reported 
outbreaks and therefore does not account for underreport-
ing or overreporting. 
Using this selection mechanism prospectively for 
identifi cation of outbreaks requiring detailed follow-up, 
FSAs can focus on 31% of all reported outbreaks and ac-
cept that 1 of 5 foodborne outbreaks will be missed. This 
fi nding may appear to lack sensitivity, but at present only 
a few foodborne outbreaks are investigated suffi ciently to 
provide information on the basis of which FSAs can act, 
which we will illustrate. In 2007, a year when an unusually 
high number of norovirus outbreaks were reported, 1 of the 
37 Municipal Health Service agencies in the Netherlands 
reported a total of 28 norovirus outbreaks. Applying this 
model to reduce the number of outbreaks needing investi-
gation from 28 to 3 is likely to greatly improve the poten-
tial for intervention and the quality of surveillance data for 
foodborne outbreaks. The tool, based on this model, will be 
implemented and evaluated in the Netherlands in 2009.
As previously identifi ed, restaurants were the most 
common setting for foodborne outbreaks (17,18). Our model 
output, however, also provides a strong fi rst indication that 
the epidemiology of norovirus outbreaks differs between 
genotypes because the proportion of non-GGII.4 outbreaks 
was higher in foodborne outbreaks. Non-GGII.4 outbreaks 
indicated source contamination, altering the probability of 
outbreaks being related to food (online Technical Appen-
dix). Unfortunately, many countries cannot take advantage 
of this result because genotyping is not among their routine 
procedures. For this reason, the practical tool was adjusted 
so that it can be restricted to epidemiologic parameters only. 
However, a rapid assay should be developed that discrimi-
nates GGII.4 from non-GGII.4, which would enable earlier 
and more targeted measures by FSAs on a large scale. 
The difference identifi ed between GGII.4 and non-
GGII.4 is a fi rst step towards identifi cation of international 
foodborne outbreaks, of which some examples are known 
(19–21). Detailed strain type and sequence information 
may provide the linking conditions for such outbreaks. Un-
fortunately, analysis of strain types did not give statistically 
signifi cant results but did suggest the existence of differ-
ences, which should be separately investigated. More data 
are needed about the diversity of noroviruses belonging to 
rare genotypes to reliably use the data when identifying a 
probable source of infection. This diversity is illustrated 
through a recent example. In the spring of 2006, an unusu-
ally high number of norovirus outbreaks was reported that 
involved passengers on cruise ships in European waters 
(22). The fi nding that several of the outbreaks were caused 
by a distinct strain of GGII.4 norovirus triggered an out-
break investigation which tested the hypothesis that these 
outbreaks might have resulted from a common source (23). 
More detailed molecular characterization, outbreak inves-
tigations, and use of molecular strain data from surveil-
lance of land-based outbreaks showed that the new variant 
strain viruses could be found across Europe, thus refl ect-
ing a widespread epidemic rather than a common source 
event. Much less is known about noroviruses belonging to 
the rare genotypes. For instance, if these viruses behave in 
an opportunistic fashion, they will circulate in the commu-
nity without causing outbreaks, going undetected because 
routine surveillance for sporadic cases is rare (24). Until 
further investigation can show epidemiologic characteris-
tics of rare genotypes, the selection tool using information 
on setting, genogroup, and number of cases enables quick 
screening of outbreaks of interest.
Several countries have conducted studies using meth-
ods to estimate the proportion of foodborne gastroenteritis 
(25–27). These studies have identifi ed foodborne norovi-
rus infections varying from 1/33 inhabitants in the United 
States to 1/780 in the United Kingdom. Prospective cohort 
studies are usually the most accurate method of ascribing 
illness to food, but are costly. Deriving estimates from ex-
isting data collections has its weaknesses (28), but the data 
collections available provide a good tradeoff between costs 
and providing useful information for public health. Num-
bers based on surveillance data need to be interpreted and 
extrapolated with caution, as international differences in 
surveillance systems can introduce bias.
Although our approach is innovative in categorizing 
norovirus outbreaks in a surveillance system, it is com-
monly applied in medical research to predict critical diag-
nostic outcomes (29–31). A limitation of our data is that 
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Figure 2. Receiving operator characteristics curves for distinction 
of foodborne outbreaks from person-to-person outbreaks in the 
training sample (upper graph, 435/439 records used) and in the 
validation sample (lower graph, 432/439 records used). The area 
under curve in the validation sample was 0.90, indicating good 
performance of the model.
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selection of outbreaks may have occurred in the database, 
e.g., if outbreaks were not reported until they had reached 
a certain size because of (secondary) person-to-person 
transmission (32). Conversely, outbreaks likely to be food-
borne may have an origin other than food (33), and con-
fi rmation of this is rare. In addition, the defi nition applied 
for a foodborne outbreak may differ substantially among 
countries. We reduced the chance of misclassifi cation by 
using retrospectively applied uniform defi nitions, and by 
selecting those countries clearly discriminating transmis-
sion modes. During the survey for categorization of sur-
veillance systems, we confi rmed that proof of a foodborne 
outbreak is often diffi cult to obtain; the transmission mode 
consequently may remain unknown relatively more fre-
quently than that of person-to-person outbreaks. However, 
the slight difference between the foodborne proportion of 
outbreaks among the outbreak with unknown (28%) and 
known (26%) transmission does not suggest a difference in 
the estimated and reported proportion. 
The European norovirus surveillance system, like most 
surveillance systems, has to cope with reporting delays and 
missing values (4,6,10). Because virologic and epidemio-
logic distinctive parameters were of interest, strict selection 
criteria were used in this study. Incompleteness in our se-
lection criteria left us with 1,254 (66%) of 1,639 norovirus 
outbreaks in our analysis dataset. Greater completeness of 
our analysis dataset may have resulted in an extended mod-
el that included a larger variety of indicators as proposed 
by EFSA, which requested an extensive minimal dataset 
for foodborne outbreaks from differing causes. However, 
our model was able to distinguish norovirus foodborne out-
breaks with far fewer indicators than those prescribed by 
EFSA. Because an optimal surveillance system for detec-
tion of diffuse foodborne outbreaks is dependent on com-
pleteness of a minimal dataset, use of the tool is likely to be 
a fi rst step towards such a system. 
We developed a practical tool that can distinguish 
food-relatedness of norovirus outbreaks and is likely to 
improve surveillance data quality. A model that predicts 
foodborne outbreaks regardless of causative agents, and 
that links conditions for viral outbreak, should be the fo-
cus of future studies. The requested minimum dataset for 
surveillance of foodborne outbreaks with potential for in-
ternational consequences needs to be clearly defi ned. The 
more information needed, the less the compliance; prior-
ity should therefore be given to information essential for 
initiating interventions. 
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